MARITIME SECURITY: TECHNOLOGY TO IMPROVE MONITORING BY - MRS. MANYATHA PRASAD WAGHRAY
MARITIME SECURITY: TECHNOLOGY TO IMPROVE MONITORING
AUTHORED BY - MRS.
MANYATHA PRASAD WAGHRAY
Abstract:
Maritime
security refers to both national security as well as the defence of the
nation's lakes and oceans. There are many offences that need to be rectified
near the water these days. These are the most current issues that have an
impact on international relations between nations. Strong security measures are
required in this location. This region has grown to be one of the global hubs
for energy and trade. Numerous historical and contemporary safety and security
issues, including drug trafficking, terrorism, robberies, illicit wildlife
trade, illegal arms trade, fishing, climate change, and more, plague the region
surrounding the Indian Ocean.
Introduction:
Maintaining
the security of the maritime realm requires the use of current technologies.
These techniques, which range from enhanced monitoring to more intelligent data
analysis, aid in understanding maritime activities and provide protection
against emerging threats.
1)
Awareness of the Maritime Domain
(MDA)
Marine
Domain Awareness (MDA) ensures a thorough grasp of marine operations and
potential threats through the use of cutting-edge technologies. This idea first
appeared in the late 20th century, and in the early 21st century it attracted a
lot of interest and development. MDA improves real-time monitoring of marine
environments by utilising data analytics and sophisticated maritime
surveillance equipment. By utilising radar, satellite images, and additional
sensor technologies, MDA offers priceless insights on maritime activities,
environmental circumstances, and suspicious activities.
Sinay is
an excellent illustration of real-time maritime environment monitoring (passive
acoustics monitoring, water quality, metoceanic conditions, air quality, etc.)
with its Solutions.
2)
Using artificial intelligence's
potential
Across
the globe, the incorporation of cutting-edge technologies like artificial
intelligence (AI) is completely changing maritime security strategies. marine
organisations can improve their capacity to keep an eye on large marine regions
and react swiftly to new dangers by employing AI-driven technologies. These
cutting-edge programs make it possible to analyse marine data in real-time,
giving authorities the ability to spot suspicious activity, recognise possible
security threats, and plan prompt interventions. Sinay helps the maritime
sector address challenges by utilising data and digital solutions. To help each
organisation find solutions, Sinay's experts, for instance, provide advice and
workshops that are specifically customised to their needs. They also direct
maritime businesses.
They also
offer guidance to maritime companies on how to use digital technologies to
enhance their operations. Predictive analytics and proactive marine security
measures are made possible by AI systems' ability to continuously learn from
and react to changing threats through the use of machine learning algorithms.
Stakeholders may increase overall maritime operating efficiency, improve
decision-making procedures, and optimise resource allocation with AI
technology.
3)
Patrols in surveillance systems:
Their function
Because
they provide prompt reactions to possible threats and improve situational
awareness, tracking devices are essential to maintaining maritime security.
Patrol and surveillance technologies offer extensive coverage of domains,
allowing authorities to track vessel movements, identify possibly illegal
activity, and enforce compliance with marine regulations. Examples of these
technology include radar, satellite photography, and drones. International
stakeholders can devise efficacious ways to optimise resource allocation,
prioritise response efforts, and minimise maritime security concerns in
heterogeneous contexts by investigating the capabilities and limitations of
surveillance technologies.
CONFLICTS OVER MARITIME BOUNDARIES
The legal
route
Different
interpretations of maritime boundary line drawing have been developed by states
(Forbes, 1995). The shape of the geographical characteristics of the land from
which the maritime boundary is derived (i.e., the direction of the coastal
front and the weight given to islands and submarine features) and which portion
of the coast is relevant to delimitation are the factors that determine these
differences (Bailey 1997; Bateman 2007; Nemeth et al., 2014). These differences
also depend on which map projection is used when drawing the boundary.
Maritime boundary disputes were widened when states extended their exclusive
economic zones (EEZs) to 200 nautical miles in the post-war era (with some
states doing so as late as the 1980s and 1990s).
Where
state borders overlapped or blended, new conflicts emerged. Additionally,
boundary disputes between the maritime zones of "opposing" or
"adjacent" coastal governments occurred or grew in importance. The
idea of "equidistance" gained prominence as the demand for their
delimitation grew. Another driving theme that came up was "equity."
Understanding how states resolve their maritime boundary disputes (and the
principles that underlie such processes) depends on an understanding of the
(legal) conflict that has developed over the previous 50 years between these
two concepts. A boundary that is equivalent to the median line at every point
along each state's shoreline is said to be equidistance.
According
to certain academics, this was formalised in Article 6(2) of the Geneva
Convention of 1958 on the Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf, which
requires governments to resolve conflicting claims by using the equidistance
principle.
States'
perceptions of "relevant" or "special" circumstances
differed, nevertheless, because courts focused on them while deciding boundary
disputes. A few international rulings have occasionally given weight to
security interests and the location of natural resources in addition to coastal
length and other geographical factors. This is known as "equity,"
which is a different concept from "equidistance." However, in
decisions over the past few decades, the International Court of Justice (ICJ)
has favoured a stringent interpretation of the circumstances that qualify as
relevant, emphasising geographical elements in a three-phase process for
defining maritime borders, as demonstrated in the 2009 Black Sea Case involving
Romania and Ukraine. In relation to the continental shelf and the EEZ, the
regulations that resolve the two Although there were initially differences in
the types of boundaries, in recent decades they have mostly converged with
judicial decisions.
The
distinction between the sea and the land
The
distinction between land and maritime space is crucial to comprehending the
legal procedures described here. In addition to the obvious reality that people
cannot easily live in maritime space, there are other significant legal
distinctions that affect maritime boundaries. The idea of occupation, which is
essential to proving ownership of land, is not as applicable in the sea sphere.
In opposition to sovereignty over land-based territory, occupation of the
continental shelf itself cannot result in shelf acquisition. With UNCLOS, a
clear division between land and sea became evident because rights to the latter
are derived from rights to the former.
Because
the characteristics of the ocean are so dissimilar from those of A rights-based
system that benefits marine governments has been applied to land and maritime
space. This growing significance of the ocean in world politics has been made
possible by the disentanglement of states' maritime rights from geophysical
characteristics. The importance of natural prolongation and the notion that
states should take the seabed's characteristics into account when drawing
boundaries for maritime space were first highlighted by the North Sea cases of
1969. After UNCLOS was concluded in the early 1980s, governments could now
claim rights to the resources within their 200 nautical mile zones without
having to demonstrate that the seabed belonged to them.
Furthermore,
sovereign rights to resources in the water column or on the seabed—rather than
exclusive rights to the entire marine "territory" in question—are
what we are talking about when it comes to states and maritime space (aside
from the territorial sea). States can only implement environmental rules in
their maritime zones and refuse actors access to marine resources, but they
cannot deny passage across their EEZs. Thus, we are talking about two distinct
types of "rights" granted by states: "Maritime boundaries (apart
from those of the territorial sea) separate only sovereign rights with a
functional, and thus limited, character, in contrast to land boundaries which
separate sovereignties in their entirety."
If both
governments have legitimate legal claims to a particular area, then
delimitation in the marine domain becomes a matter of "reasonable
sacrifice such as would make possible a division of the area of overlap."
As in the case of a cooperative fisheries zone or oil and gas resources, joint
sharing is also feasible. Remembering the important distinction between
complete sovereignty, as described by, for instance, Krasner's (1999) accounts,
and sovereign rights (EEZ, continental shelf) is vital.
Today's
maritime boundary disputes
The
procedures by which states resolve disputes over maritime boundaries are very
different from the ideas that direct the design of such limits. States have a
number of options for resolving disputes: they can reach an amicable agreement
through bilateral talks; they can take the matter to the International Court of
Justice (ICJ) or another international tribunal, like the International
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS); or they can use third-party
arbitration, like the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA).
If at all
possible, settlement routes involving international arbitration are the least
desirable of these choices. States are not motivated to file lawsuits before
courts and tribunals when there is uncertainty over the result of international
adjudication and arbitration. States can choose a creative solution unrestricted
by the international laws enforced by courts and tribunals when a dispute is
resolved bilaterally. States find it costly to pursue delimitation in this way
since litigation is expensive and the maritime domain process frequently
necessitates a large amount of scientific evidence.
States
are allowed to use any method they choose when defining maritime space, as a
result of which about 95% of maritime boundaries that have been agreed upon
between 1950 and 2020 were reached through negotiations outside the purview of
arbitration or adjudication. Studies reveal, however, that even when
governments choose for bilateral talks rather than the constraints of
international arbitration and adjudication, they still rely on and generally
follow the legal principles as outlined by decisions from foreign courts.
NON-TRADITONAL THREATS
Even if
stability is still essential to the growth of IOR, the socioeconomic diversity
of the area has led to varying perceptions of threat and a lack of shared
knowledge. Given that maritime trade security requires both internal and global
interests have converged in the marine realm amongst the five fundamental
components of the shipping industry: cargo, ports, sailors, ships, and ISLs.
Security concerns that arise from land-based socioeconomic causes can extend to
the maritime sphere. These violations, combined with the uniform nature of the
water, which absolves the high seas of all authority, have enabled the
non-traditional security dangers to proliferate widely throughout the Indian
water. Natural disasters, terrorism, piracy, drug and people trafficking, and
the illicit transportation of weaponry, including WMDs, are a few of these.
Non-traditional
security concentrates on non-military threats that share the following traits:
·
From their point of genesis to
their consequences, the threats are international in character.
·
Rather than being explained as
the outcome of power struggles or shifts in the distribution of power among
nations, they are commonly discussed in political and economic terms.
·
Security is threatened by
non-traditional security issues include irregular migration and resource
scarcity because they lead to social unrest and political instability.
·
The delicate natural balance is
frequently disturbed by human activity, leading to other dangers like climate
change, which have severe repercussions for both states and communities and are
frequently hard to undo or repair.
·
Since national responses to these
challenges are typically inadequate, local, and worldwide collaboration is
necessary. Security is no longer only defined by the state (on concerns
pertaining to territorial integrity or state sovereignty), but also the people
(their survival, welfare, and dignity) on a personal basis and social level.
1.
Theft and Armed Robberies
The
Indian Ocean's vastness dense trade and lax maritime law enforcement have
encouraged piracy, which has expanded dramatically during the last five years
in the Malacca Strait, Somali Basin, and Red Sea. Even though the source of this
maritime lawlessness is on land, numerous countries have stationed their
warships near the coast of Somalia in an attempt to safeguard commercial cargo.
As a result, there have been fewer pirate assaults in the previous three years;
in 2013, only 15 ships reported assaults off Somalia's coast, down from 237 in
2011. Similarly, there were two instances of hijacking in 2013 compared to 14
in 2012 and 28 in 2011.
But during that same time frame, there was a steady rise in pirate incidents in
Indonesian waters.
Three
specialised The SNMG 1 and 2 of NATO the EU NAVFOR, along with CTF 15 are the
counter-piracy coalition forces that have been in operation since 2008 in an
effort to stop pirate away from Somalia's coast. In addition, merchantmen are
being separately escorted by warships from South Korea, Japan, China, Russia,
and India. Force-providing governments and coalitions employ the mechanism
referred to as Shared Awareness and De-confliction (SHADE), which was launched
in 2009, to share intelligence and coordinate the deployment of warships in the
Globally Acknowledged Transit Corridor (GTC) situated in the Gulf of Aden. 2012
saw the decision by South Korea, Japan, China, and India will coordinate their
escort activities in order to maximise the deployment of warships as a result
of the SHADE agreement.
Despite
the threat, only significant both local and distant players are contributing to
counter-piracy operations. The main reasons a pan-region system hasn't emerged
are an inadequate capacity for the region and lack of a foundation for regional
security. Indian policymakers have rejected multinational engagements when
engaging in anti-piracy efforts despite the Indian Navy's (IN) insistence on
them because of domestic political concerns. Following considerable pressure
and an annual cost of 80 crores for separate escort operations, the authorities
eventually consented to India lagging behind South Korea, Japan, and China in
coordination.
2.
Trafficking in Drugs and
Unauthorised Migration
Small
arms proliferation, narcoterrorism, and drug trafficking are closely related.
Immigration without authorization and covert drug trafficking in and there are
signs of political unrest and poor governance all throughout the Indian Ocean.
This issue has been exacerbated by uncontrolled vessel movement, containerised
maritime commerce, and Flags of Convenience (FoC) shipping.
The Golden Triangle (Myanmar, Thailand, and Laos) and the Golden Crescent
(Pakistan, Iran, and Afghanistan) are crossed by drug trafficking, which
results in money laundering and the funding of gunrunning, insurgency, and
terrorism. A further international security risk that exacerbates
socio-political instability is human trafficking.
Small arms proliferation since the end of the Cold War, has increased, which
puts domestic security in many nations at serious risk. It foreshadows a grave
danger to security between and within states by redistributing authority
between the state and non-state actors (terrorists, drug dealers, and insurgents).
Given the significant scope of these issues in the IOR, collaboration across
the regional community is imperative in addressing these formidable challenges
to state sovereignty.
3.
Globalisation
Populations
have more access to the economy thanks to globalisation, which depends solely
on the unrestricted flow of international seaborne trade. But terrorists and
rogues also take advantage of these openings, employing maritime commerce to
smuggle WMD materials into unlawful territories. Even though the main tool in
the fight against proliferation may be diplomacy, containment will always be
the solution. In IOR, the Initiative for Proliferation Security (PSI), which
aims to encourage the intercepting of illicit WMD cargo, has not been
subscribed to. In addition to the UN's lack of support, PSI faces two main
legal obstacles. First of all, the Law of the Sea restricts the ability to
stop, board, and search ships without authorization. Second, because the
transportation of materials for illicit WMD purposes is not a crime that is
punished internationally, it is difficult to seize them or prosecute the
traffickers.
Without intelligence cooperation, There is too much to explore in the Indian
Ocean nation to contain any unlawful migration. Although technology has the
potential to use to obtain precise Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA), willing
nations working together to exchange intelligence and present a single front is
more crucial.
4.
Natural Disasters
Because
of the dense population along the coastal regions, this region experiences
severe results from over 60% of natural disasters worldwide. In such cases,
relief efforts are platform intense, requiring group involvement and effort.
AN OVERVIEW OF NON-TRADITIONAL SECURITY ISSUES
South
Asia
Natural
catastrophes have resulted in a series of problems for the South Asian region. For
example, in 2004 the Indian Ocean was ravaged by a massive tsunami and
earthquakes littoral regions. Cyclone Sidr devastated Bangladesh, Afghanistan,
Pakistan, India, and Sri Lanka after making landfall in 2007 was a couple years
later. Cyclone Amphan in 2020 caused around 5 million people to be uprooted from
their residences in Bhutan, Bangladesh, India, and Myanmar; this was one of the
largest natural disaster-related displacements ever recorded. These
catastrophes cause significant death tolls as well as financial damages.
Insufficient inadequate post-disaster recovery efforts and early warning
systems actions frequently exacerbate the effects.
Additionally,
lately countries in the area have been addressing an increase of NTS hazards
because of the changing climate. Increasing ocean levels, as per the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), would have disastrous
consequences for the region's low-lying communities. River systems may be
seriously threatened by the glacial recession that is currently occurring in
the Himalayas, for instance.
Furthermore,
Migration due to climate change is becoming more frequent. According to a 2018
World Bank assessment, the effects of climate change will force over 140
million people to leave their home nations by the year 2050. Climate
change-related migration affects access to necessities like healthcare and
education as well as escalating tensions and inequality. For instance,
Bangladesh is now a centre for this issue. Adding to Bangladesh's difficulties
is the influx of Myanmar's Rohingya refugees. Out of a million, 860,000 are
Rohingyas who have been internally displaced and who are seeking asylum
Bangladesh alone is home to refugees from numerous neighbouring countries, as
per the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR).
Southeast
Asia
The
illicit drug gang that controls the Golden Triangle, which is thought to rank
as the second-biggest drug-producing region in the world and the primary
producer of opium, still has its headquarters in Southeast Asia.
According
to UN estimates, poppy production has expanded to 60,703 hectares, or 150,000
acres, of land in Myanmar, having tripled since 2006. Even though Myanmar's
economy has grown somewhat, development initiatives have not reached the
country's periphery, which has allowed industries like poppy growing to
flourish. Although the UN has tried to intervene by implementing crop
substitution in Laos and Myanmar, the problem of drug trafficking has only
become worse quickly, creating difficulties for other countries as well.
For
example, Vietnam, which has some of the strictest drug prohibitions in the
world, is a centre for the transportation of methamphetamine and heroin. The
usage of stimulants similar to amphetamines (ATS), which are trafficked and
smuggled from the Golden Triangle's borders, is shifting away from heroin in
nations like China, Korea, Japan, and the ASEAN countries.
Southeast
Asian nations, particularly Vietnam, Thailand, Indonesia, Myanmar, and the
Philippines are facing numerous climate-related hazards, much like their South
Asian counterparts. According to UN estimates, Southeast Asia's risk of floods
and droughts, for instance, would only rise over the next ten years, resulting
in financial losses equivalent to 3% of GDP for Laos, above 1.5% for the
Philippines, and 2% for over 1.5 percentage in favour of Cambodia.
Other
threats are equally dire: due to overexploitation of palm oil, Indonesia's
forest cover has decreased from 65.4% in 1990 to 50.2% in 2013; plastic garbage
from China and a few other SEA nations, makes up a significant portion of all
the plastic trash in the waters worldwide; additionally, considering their
placement inside the Pacific Ring of Fire, nations like Indonesia and the
Philippines are constantly at risk of earthquake-related disasters.
Small
Island Nations
Small
islands continue to have low greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, but the risks of
global warming—particularly sea level rise—to these islands cannot be
understated. Natural disasters, unlawful and unsustainable resource extraction,
and international crime are among problems faced by these states. Frequently,
they lack the means to address the challenges, and as a result, multilateral
collaborations would be required.
WORKING TOGETHER ON CONTEMPORARY PLATFORMS FOR
NON-TRADITIONAL SECURITY ISSUES
Collaborations
aimed at bolstering traditional security are abundant. It is essential to grow completely
new structures for cooperation as well as to broaden the purview of current
procedures to encompass the mitigation of NTS dangers.
Institutional
Framework
a.
ASEAN
The
regional security system of ASEAN has been continually tested over time by NTS
problems. The 1997 Asian financial crisis, the 2002–2003 SARS outbreak, the
2007 avian flu pandemic, and, most recently, the 2020–starting Covid-19 pandemic
are a few examples.
To
address the diverse issues, ASEAN has established several mechanisms. The
ASEAN-wide Agreement on Emergency Response and Disaster Management, for
instance, provides the member states with a strong policy foundation to support
their combined efforts in lowering the risk of disasters as well as reacting to
them. In the meantime, members of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) collaborate to
improve peace as well as regional safety through the evolution of suitable
policy. The states can now pursue political alignment and security cooperation
thanks to the efforts of the ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC).
The ASEAN
Plan of Action to Combat Human Trafficking, Particularly of Women and Children has
detailed action plans that must adhere to both pertinent international
responsibilities and the national legislation and regulations of ASEAN members
nations. The objective is to tackle shared regional issues among all
participating nations. In response to the Covid-19 epidemic, the member states
of ASEAN initiated information-sharing and issued a Movement Restriction Order
(MRO) at the beginning of 2020.
Additionally,
ASEAN collaborates with other nations on various fronts. As an illustration, it
established the ASEAN Plus Three (APT) project with South Korea, Japan, and
China. The bloc participates in the Disaster Relief Exercise of the ASEAN
Regional Forum alongside India.
India does, in fact, hope to establish close connections with the Coordinating
Centre for ASEAN for Disaster Management Aid to the Humanitarian. India has
additionally shown a desire to collaborate alongside ASEAN in the creation of
generic pharmaceuticals and medical technology during the Covid-19 outbreak.
b.
Blue Dot Network
In 2019,
the United States and its supporters launched the Blue Dot Network (BDN) to
encourage the growth of infrastructure. Cooperating with nations such as
Australia, Japan, and India, the BDN places a strong emphasis on infrastructure
projects' sustainability. An infrastructure project that has earned a BDN
accreditation is trying to be sustainable. The Blue Dot Marketplace can assist
nations in building sustainable infrastructure by highlighting possible effects
on disaster preparedness, food security, and wellness. A significant BDN
agreement addresses an initiative pertaining to "smart cities" among
the ASEAN countries.
c.
Association for the Indian Ocean
Rim (IORA)
With 23
member states and 10 conversation partners, the Indian Ocean Rim Association
(IORA) seeks to promote sustainable development and regional cooperation in the
area. The group seeks to address the various conventional and unconventional
security and safety issues that the nations in the area face, such as
terrorism, human trafficking, illegal immigration, piracy, armed robbery at
sea, and the trafficking of drugs and weaponry, and wildlife. Crimes related to
the fisheries industry include illegal fishing, damaging ocean health, and
misusing marine resources. These problems are made worse by the problems caused
by global warming.
A schedule for the establishment of the Working Group on Disaster Risk
Management (WGDRM) within IORA was established at the inaugural Disaster Risk
Expert Group Management of IORA in January 2021. The IORA Guidelines for HADR
operations in the Indian Ocean were also finalised by member states. By
implementing the suggestion in the IORA Action Plan to establish an ongoing
Working Group on Maritime Safety and Security, the IORA should increase
collaboration in the fight against non-traditional security issues surrounding
the Indian Ocean.
d.
BIMSTEC
The
BIMSTEC countries—Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Myanmar, Nepal, Sri Lanka, and
Thailand-have determined that combating international crime and terrorism is a
critical requirement for both sustainable development and regional peace. 2009
saw the group adopt the "BIMSTEC Convention on Cooperation in Fighting
Transnational Organised Crime, Illicit Drug Trafficking, and International Terrorism."
With fifteen articles, the custom serves as a guarantee-boosting tool for
participating nations to work together to fight transnational organised
criminality, worldwide terrorism, and the illicit trade in narcotics and
psychoactive substances, including their precursor chemicals, while adhering to
national laws and regulations.
However,
unauthorised migration and human trafficking are not included in the pact. The
BIMSTEC member states' national security advisers (NSAs) have been meeting
annually, but the ratification of the mechanism for cooperation is still
pending.
After that, the NSAs will devise plans for coordination and collaboration in
the areas of security, intelligence, as well as law enforcement. This could
facilitate the strengthening of the security system and make real-time
information sharing possible. When it comes to disaster management, BIMSTEC can
help with strengthening capacity through the sharing of information and
technical expertise, standard operating procedure draughting, disaster reaction
force creation, and funding allocation.
Forums About
Miniatures
a.
The Quad
The US,
India, Japan, and Australia are the partners in the Quadrilateral Security
discussion (often known as the "Quad"), a strategic security
discussion aimed at leveraging partner complementarities to promote prosperity
in the Indo-Pacific region. Selected ASEAN nations can participate in
issue-based cooperation within a larger Quad agenda that addresses
collaboration in non-military areas such as infrastructure, quantum computing,
artificial intelligence (AI), Covid response, climate change, key technologies
and materials, reliable supply chains, and cyber concerns. The Quad is also
while constructing a robust framework for disaster relief and Indo-Pacific
capacity building. In this network, vaccine diplomacy is important, but there is
still more that can be done to address other NTS issues.
b.
Trilateral India-Japan-Australia
India,
Japan, and Australia may find that the Indo-Pacific region's geostrategic area
is ideal for fostering regional cooperation and a rules-based system. The three
nations have pledged to supply HADR to one another as well as to their adjacent
states. Additionally, India and Japan have collaborated on exercises that
centre on HADR operations.
Through the exchange of medical supplies in addition to HADR activities for the
general growth the Covid-19 epidemic has given the countries of the trilateral
a chance to focus on scientific advancement and research capabilities.
Another
issue is IUU fishing, which has only gotten worse because of consumer demand
and threatens to make these few resources even more scarce. There's also the
risk of marine crimes like irregular marine arrivals; forced work; and piracy,
trafficking, and smuggling. India, Japan, and Australia, who are all home to
sizable fishing communities, ought to cooperate via the IORA and other focused
venues like the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC) in order to broaden their
influence.
METHODS FOR CREATING COOPERATIVE SECURITY BARRIERS
TO COOPERATIVE MECHANISMS
The
post-war period's developments have increased knowledge of the requirement to reinterpret
what constitutes international security. When combined, the plethora regarding
security that is not conventional issues in IOR are far more than any one body
could possibly handle. The maritime doctrine of India highlights the transition
from traditional fighting to incorporate unconventional dangers in recognition
of the difficulties that surround Indian coasts. This underlines IN's benign
and constable duties in the Indian Ocean. Even if extra-regional fleets help
protect ships from piracy, such extensive deployments could not be financially
viable in the future. Therefore, in the short- to medium-term, strong and
ongoing coordination amongst important regional entities is required to evolve
the IOR's marine security. In order to maintain policy consistency, cooperation
would be required.
BLOCKERS OF COLLABORATIVE MECHANISMS
A common
agreement to address activities threatening Indian Ocean trade routes is
necessary given the reliance on marine trade for long-term economic growth. But
before approving a regional cooperative plan, it is necessary to examine some
of this particular region's special qualities.
The
Indian Ocean is commonly separated into four smaller areas, namely East Africa,
the Middle East, South Asia, and Australasia, rather than seeing it as a single
regional region.
Second, various forms regional power dynamics, sectarianism, internal political
turmoil, and governance plague this centre of third-world nations, which are
all significant barriers to regional collaboration. Thirdly, pan-region
security efforts have been eclipsed by a climate of suspicion and mistrust
brought about by standard interstate security concerns. Lastly,
non-conventional marine challenges lead to issues involving both players in
politics, both state and non-state, the economy, and humanitarianism. It is
difficult to conceptualise remedies for the problems of human security and
non-traditional transnational security, in contrast to traditional security.
These obstruct regional solidarity, as does the heterogeneity of IOR at every
turn.
BRINGING COOPERATIVE SECURITY BACK
Cooperation
in the economy has brought together governments and citizens for the sake of
mutual economic progress, with the advantages manifesting in diverse economic
divisions. Political and security issues are then frequently better understood
as a result of economic security. Despite globalisation, economic interests,
and regional diversity have dominated the discussion of geostrategic issues, uniting
sub-regional organisations. Economic commonalities and interdependencies at the
sub-regional level have been effectively translated into sub-regional
organisations such as ARF, ASEAN, GCC, SAARC, EAC, and ADC. Nonetheless, the
majority of these have limited seafaring security charters and are oriented
geographically or culturally. The Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) and the
Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS), two pan-IOR institutions, are notable
outliers, though, as their member states are geographically dispersed
throughout the region and are also members of one or more subregional
associations for commerce. There are six discussion partners, two observers,
and twenty member states in the IORA. IONS was an IN project launched in 2008
with the goal of strengthening information exchange between regional navies to
confront maritime security threats to the IOR. As of right now, 35 countries
are members of this construct. IORA brought together developed, developing, and
rising countries for trade, investments, technology, and education across
Australia, Africa, and Asia. The group is reviving by adopting a marine
regionalism-based collective Indian Ocean security paradigm, following ten
years of hibernation. The organisation reiterated its shared a desire for the
prosperity, safety, and peace of the entire IOR countries in the Perth
Communiqué in November 2013, acknowledging the significance of IONS
complementarity.
REDEFINING INDIAN OCEAN GEOPOLITICS
From
India's vantage point, the IOR's geopolitics are being redefined by three
developments. First, marine security that isn't traditional. The IOR's larger
framework is increasingly being used to depict the difficulties in Asian
waters. Second, the US's position as the IOR's primary security supplier is
comparatively waning as it directs its attention towards the Asia-Pacific
region. Thirdly, in order to solve maritime concerns, India must form
relationships with states that share its interests as its modernization takes
shape. IORA has confirmed the initial breakthrough by acknowledging that its
participants have an interest in regional security as well. As a result, in
order to support IONS, it is lining up with maritime security, safety, and
disaster management. Paradoxically, despite its governmental level organisation
up to this point, There was no agenda on maritime security adopted by the IORA.
However, despite bringing regional navies together to talk about marine
security, IONS has not received support from the government. This has continuously
prevented IONS from converting operational procedures for marine security
agendas. The new background facilitates the establishment of an implementable
pan region mechanism and enhances the synergy between IONS and IORA.
According
to the 2012 Strategic Guidance for the US DoD, India would provide stability
and act as an economic anchor for the area.
But India hasn't shown any indication of this intention. India's lack of
dedication stems from its anti-multilateralist foreign policy, which is based
on sovereignty, non-alignment, and strategic autonomy. Indian officials
particularly avoid international military operations even after twenty years of
economic multilateralism. In order to become a unified force that unites
neighbouring states to mitigate marine threats, India would have to reevaluate
its strategy. Preventing any polarisation of the IOR remains India's primary
concern, notwithstanding its aspirations to become a central player in regional
dynamics. India has restricted its actions to bilateral interactions with
significant extra-regional powers. Even so, this helps to highlight India's
good intentions, as seen by the country's indications that it is reevaluating
its approach to military engagement.
The
decision to establish trilateral marine cooperation between India, the
Maldives, and Sri Lanka and to take part in the multilateral exercise
"RIMPAC 2014" in July 2013 provide as evidence of this policy change.
India is also moving from moralism to pragmatism by abandoning its long-standing
reserve against military operations outside of the UN system.
Given the
current force posture of the IN, it is neither practical nor cost-effective to
maintain a constant security cover based on numerous bilateral engagements in
the IOR, where unconventional threats have spread unchecked. Due to India's
vigorous bilateral diplomacy, the navy now only operates in certain time and
space zones and maintains a limited presence. When sprinting This programme
runs the risk of operating beyond its intended scope due to the IN's current
capacity and competence.
CONCLUSION
Maritime
security is now popular. It is meaningless in the extreme. Its significance is
realised through the performers' attempts to fill it with various topics,
relate it to others, and act in its name. Therefore, it is pointless to try to
come up with a definition of maritime security that everyone can agree upon.
The goal of this article is to provide strategies for handling the concept's
multiple voices. In order to disentangle political interests and worldviews and
to understand the meaning of maritime security, three methodologies have been
developed. These tactics offer a fruitful starting point for researching
maritime security and examining the various viewpoints of participants in
various contexts.
Therefore,
posing the question "What is Maritime Security?" results in a
potential study plan that maps out the definition of the term. Such research
directly affects national and international policy. They promote understanding
amongst actors by making clear when and how they agree and disagree. They make
it possible to deal with issues of coordination and to interpret maritime
disputes differently, beginning with an examination of the meaning that various
actors attribute to the marine as a security domain rather than with the
presumed interests of the parties involved. Lastly, these investigations will
also help define the boundaries of the developing subfield of Maritime Security
Studies and stress the cross-disciplinary connections to studies of global
governance, economics, development, and the environment.
Maritime
security presents a world where threats foster resilience and difficulties
welcome creativity. Surveillance and reaction capacities are improved by
embracing contemporary technology like MDA and AI, as well as by comprehending
regulatory frameworks like UNCLOS and organisations like the IMO. States and
stakeholders can maintain protection and reduce dangers for both the present
and the future generations by consistently improving monitoring systems and
placing a high priority on international collaboration. A comprehensive marine
security system includes coastline monitoring in addition to ship and port
security, guaranteeing a coordinated effort to protect the maritime area. Safeguarding
the marine domain entails more than just keeping people safe; it also requires
juggling complexity and directing the planet's essential rivers in an ethical
manner.
